Monday, March 29, 2010

The Sino-US Technology Marathon

Sino-U.S. Technology Marathon 1


Milton Kotler

President, Kotler Marketing Group

February, 2010

mkotler@kotlermarketing.com

www.kotler.com.cn

www.kotlermarketing.com


1
I wish to acknowledge the research assistance of Blake Nixon, KMG, in developing this article




The Sino-U.S. Technology Marathon


There is an international competition for public and private R&D investment in new technologies that will produce the next generation of industries and jobs. While many smaller countries in the West invest a larger percentage of their smaller budgets in R&D, the outcome of this race will be dictated by a marathon of two giants – the U.S. and China.


Current academic literature in the West, notably China's Emerging Technological Edge, by Denis Fred Simon and Cong Cao, Cambridge UK, Cambridge University Press, 2009 is skeptical that China can manage the science and technology human capital resources to achieve China's desired economic output. The book concludes, "It should be clear from this study that China's science, technology and managerial base does not constitute a critical source of competitive advantage in economic and technological terms." (p.345).


My experience in China and research has led me to a different conclusion, namely that in many sectors of new technology, China is nearing par, on par, or fast approaching par with the U.S. I am not referring to basic science, but to applied and translational research for commercialization.


Paradoxically, much of my data is the same as that of the skeptics, except that we place different weight on one metric of competition – rate of growth. The skeptics are not mindless of this variable. The skeptics diminish the importance of rapid Chinese R&D growth rate, by assuming a steady and even marginally increasing rate in the U.S.


By the end of 2008, global contract sales of Huawei Technologies, China's largest telecoms gear maker, jumped 46 percent to 23.3 billion USD. Huawei also forecast sales of more than 30 billion USD in 2009.

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The difference between us is that the skeptics, notably Simon and Cao wrote their books before September 2008, the date of the fall of Lehman Brothers and the onslaught of the Western financial crisis. From that moment forward, a major alteration in relative R&D growth rates occurred. The U.S. de-accelerated R&D private investment in favor of financial rescue. China continued to grow technology R&D investment. Their skepticism may have been valid before the financial crisis (BFC), not after the financial crisis (AFC). They wrote before this happened. I am writing after it has happened.


The irony of this prefatory note is that American academic writers and journalists have steadily assumed American financial stability and constitutionally based social stability; while assuming that with continued wealth growth and income disparity the Chinese social order will implode. In fact, in AFC the American and Western financially order imploded, while China has forged ahead financially and has retained its social stability.



The Facts


As of 2010 (YTD) the U.S. is expected to spend $401 billion, or 2.85% of its GDP, on R&D and China is spending $141 billion (USD), or 1.48% of its GDP on R&D. China's growth rate of R&D spending is currently running at 17%, far in excess of what the Battelle Institute expects to be a U.S. R&D growth rate of 3.7% of GDP over 2009. With double digit annual R&D growth for the past decade, China is expected to match the R&D spending by all of Europe combined in 2018, and match U.S. R&D spending in 2022.


For a critical understanding of the competition in R&D investment, we have to factor three elements into the equation. The first is the relative ratios of public and private R&D expenditure. 70% of Chinese R&D is government funded (including State-owned enterprises), against 27% for the U.S. While U.S. private sector spending for R&D represent 73% of the total R&D spend, it is important to note that 55% of U.S. private R&D is spent off-shore in consort with offshore production; very little Chinese R&D is off-shore. Because of this, U.S. R&D has a reduced impact on U.S. domestic economic growth and job creation in new technology sectors.


The second element is the relative proportions of R&D expenditure between basic science and applied science R&D. The U.S. spends 18% of total R&D on basic science, while China spends less than 5%. U.S. Federal government R&D expenditure has been historically devoted to basic science performed by national laboratories and universities, while Chinese R&D, both public and private, is principally dedicated to applied science and translational research for commercialization. This factor has a huge impact on near term economic impact. China gets more economic bang for R&D buck, while the U.S. government subsidizes global applied science.


The third factor is the relative ratios of public U.S and Chinese R&D to defense spending. Historically, between 50 and 60 percent of the U.S. Federal R&D investment is made in defense. Most of this investment (93.6 percent in FY 2010) is made in the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) account in the Department of Defense (DOD) with smaller amounts coming from Atomic Energy Defense Activities at the Department of Energy and other programs within the DOD. The 2010 U.S. budget shifted more R&D funding to non-defense spending.


For Chinese defense R&D spending, we turn to the OECD which estimates that China's current military budget generally "ranges from roughly US$40 billion to US$90 billion a year. Trends in Chinese spending on R&D are even more difficult to ascertain. However, a reasonable estimate of current Chinese spending on military R&D might be US$2-5 billion." If we take Chinese total 2010 R&D spend at $141 billion, and assume that Chinese defense R%D is contained in its total R&D spending, we have a 2%-4% defense related portion of total R&D spending. This divergence in defense related R&D has a crucial impact on economic output. The greatest portion by far of Chinese R&D is directed toward commercial output. The greatest portion of U.S. R&D goes for basic science and defense related purposes.


A fourth factor of importance in the rate of technology growth is the number of scientists and engineers each country is graduating annually. As of 2006 the U.S. was graduating 70,000 engineers a year (many Chinese and Indians), while China was graduating 600,000. A Duke University study subtracted the number of Chinese sub-baccalaureate transactional, or technician, engineers which it estimated at 290,000, leaving an annual number of Chinese dynamic engineers (U.S. standard) at 310,000, or four times the U.S. annual number. The Chinese number has grown since 2006, while the U.S. number has remained stable.


A fifth element is the marathon is scientific research output represented by peer reviewed articles in scientific journals. Here the U.S. enjoys a big lead, but Chinese scientists and researchers have quadrupled the number of published papers in the past decade, second only to the USA, and are on course to overtake the US by 2020.


A sixth element of new technology growth is patent protection. As of 2007 nearly 50 million patent documents, covering 18 countries, are gathered in the Chinese Patent Office. A small percentage of these have international patent protection and domestic IP is relatively weak. By contrast, the U.S. Patent office issued 7 million patents by 2006, with a large percentage that are internationally protected. The U.S. patent is still the gold standard of international IP. The global value of new discoveries and inventions requires U.S. patent protection, since the U.S. is still a major global market for investment and commercialization of new technologies.


Despite China's strides, researchers in China accounted for only about 1% of the roughly 150,000 U.S. patents granted in 2008, whereas U.S.-based inventors accounted for 49% of U.S. patents granted. The relatively weak IP regime in China enables Chinese enterprises to copy international designs and bring them to play in the domestic market more quickly and at lower cost than internationally protected offerings. This perverse effect of weak IP has been a major stimulant to technology advancement in China for the past decades. But with the growth of indigenous discovery and invention, China will have to harden its IP and forsake this advantage.


A seventh element of R&D impact is that Chinese companies in 2008 had the highest number of IPOs in the world, completing 183 deals, while the U.S. completed 54 IPOs in 2008 and Europe completed 62 IPOs. This reflects the greater Chinese R&D emphasis on translational development of research for commercialization, as well as greater liquidity in Asian markets than in Western markets. But it also reflects easier regulatory and underwriting standards.


From this evidence we can that China is developing indigenous technologies and adopting technologies from all over the world to build a 21st century new technology economy. Barring unforeseen circumstances, China may in the near term equal and even exceed U.S. publicly supported R&D and the U.S. will lag behind China in the economic impact of new technologies. The graph on the following page is illustrative of this trend.


Georgia Tech's recent HTI indicator report predicts that China will pass the US in translational research and new product development by 2018. The four "HTI" indicators are:

National Orientation to Compete

Socio-Economic Infrastructure

Technological Infrastructure

Productive Capacity

Development: The systematic use of the knowledge gained from research directed toward the production of useful materials, devices, systems, or methods.












The East Asia Marathon


Before moving on to the Sino-U.S. technology race, it is important to clarify China's relation to Asian technology. Commentary in the West generally refers to the shifting trends of high tech R&D from the West to Asia. We have to clarify that reference to Asia in this context principally means China.


China's traditional role in the Asian region, vis-a-vis the Asian Tigers, was low cost technology assembly, packaging and export of consumer and business products. This is rapidly changing to China's high tech, capital intensive, value added production for a number of reasons: 1) Incoming FDI is increasingly for high tech production; 2) China is advancing its skilled human capital base of scientists and engineers, while retaining low cost intellectual capital; 3) China provides much greater IP security by supporting company measures for "black boxing" technology; 4) The Chinese government had instituted attractive incentives for high tech domestic and foreign innovation; 5) There has been a greater willingness by Hong Kong and Taiwan in both policy and FDI to transfer technology to China; 6) Large numbers of foreign educated and employed scientists and engineers are returning to China; and 7) At current levels of spending, China alone will outspend Japan in R&D by mid-2010.



New Technology Sectors in China and the U.S.


We will explore the Sino-U.S. marathon in eleven sectors of new technology: 1)Telecommunications; 2) New Energy, including solar, wind power, nuclear power, and clean coal, carbon capture & storage; 3) Electric Vehicles and Advanced Batteries; 4) Biomedical, Translational and Clinical Research; 5) Nanotechnology; 6) IC/Electronic Industry; 7) Advanced equipment production (industrial robotics, sensors, signals, etc); 8) High tech research and production parks; and 9) High speed rail.



Telecommunications


AT&T and its famed Bell Laboratory was for decades a world leader in telecommunications. When AT&T was parceled into independent regional companies by re-regulation in the 1980s, the Bell Lab was re-structured as an independent equipment maker, named Lucent. In 2006 Lucent merged with French owned Alcatel to better contend for dominance in the global industry. By 2009 Alcatel Lucent revenues of $21 billion USD were topped by a Chinese private Company – Huawei. The story of Chinese leadership in the telecommunication equipment can be seen in the dramatic growth of Huawei revenues of $30 billion in 2009.


Huawei is the largest networking and telecommunications equipment supplier in China and headquartered in Shenzhen. It was established in 1988 as a private high-tech enterprise specializing in R&D, production and marketing of communications equipments, and providing customized network services for telecom carriers. By the end of 2008, global contract sales of Huawei Technologies, China's largest telecoms gear maker, jumped 46 percent to $23.3 billion USD. Huawei forecasted sales of more than $30 billion in 2009.


Huawei serves 35 of the top 50 telecom operators and puts 10 per cent of revenue into R&D each year. In addition to the R&D centers in China it has R&D centers in Stockholm, Dallas, Silicon Valley, , Bangalore, Ireland, Moscow Jakarta and the Netherlands. It is a global Company and has within a short period of time has risen to become the world No. 2 company in the mobile equipment industry behind Ericsson, replacing Nokia Siemens for the #2 spot.


In December, 2009, Huawei beat Ericsson to win deals to build next-generation networks for major mobile carriers in Norway and Sweden. Huawei was the largest applicant for patents in 2009 and in that year overtook Alcatel-Lucent in 2009 to become #1 in global optical networking equipment. Huawei is planning an IPO. Huawei is a potential buyer of Motorola's network division, which is planned for sale.



The New Energy Race:

The U.S. has been struggling for over a decade to lead the worldwide energy race. Every step for forward, propelled by increasing oil prices, has led to a step backwards, as oil prices fell. Congress has failed to pass an energy bill, over disputes on global warming, cap & trade, nuclear energy and a sidebar of special interests barriers. Despite rhetoric, President Obama is not making any headway on this front. As a result, the private sector is reluctant to invest in translational research and development. Meanwhile, China races forward.


Deutsche Bank asserts that China is a low risk environment for new energy investment. It has generous and well-targeted clean energy incentives, as well as high levels of private investment and a comprehensive and integrated government plan. By contrast, it describes the U.S. as a "moderate-risk" country with volatile incentives, a lack of enabling infrastructure and an inversion to government-led investment


According to the New York Times article, China Leading Global Race to Make Clean Energy, "… the West may someday trade its dependence on oil from the Mideast for a reliance on solar panels, wind turbines and other gear manufactured in China." China is subsidizing greater public investment in applied R&D than U.S. public investment in alternative energies that are not yet cost effective for the market place. Chinese policy mandates for clean technology are stronger than the US. China has a first-mover advantage, and will capture more substantial domestic and international investment to clean energy industries than the United States. In the next 5 year plan, China will call for more Chinese domestic consumption. Conversely, the US will import from China clean tech equipment, which will further increase the trade deficit. The U.S. will become a clean tech user, not a clean tech producer. This means service jobs, not manufacturing jobs.


China plans to generate 20% of its electricity from renewable sources by 2020, while the US is projected to reach 10% by that date. Chinese local governments are offering firms free land and R&D money. State-owned banks are offering loans to clean tech firms at 2%, much lower than financing in the U.S. The U.S. energy sector invests less than one quarter of one percent
of annual revenues in R&D activities. This is one-tenth the US industry average of 2.6%. According to China's Medium to Long Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology, 2006 to 2020, the criterion for qualifying an enterprise as high tech requires a range of 3% - 6% of sales revenue invested in R&D, the highest degree for smaller firms. Under this standard, the U.S. new energy industry, by average enterprise, would not qualify as high tech by Chinese standards.


As a portion of annual revenues, U.S. energy sector R&D investments are two orders of magnitude lower than leading innovation-intensive sectors such as Biomedical technology R&D at 10-20% of annual revenues; Semiconductor R&D at 16% of annual sales; and Information technology at 10&-15% of annual sales.

It may be a forlorn misnomer to even call U.S new energy industry a high tech sector. Let's examine this industry by sectors.



Solar


China currently exports 98% of its PV output, and is the leading solar exporter in the world. It also has the largest solar manufacturing capacity in the world. It has one-third of global solar manufacturing capacity and supplies 30% of the global PV market. The U.S. supplies only 5%. China's 2008 PV production volume was 1.8 GW, from 820 MW in 2007. US PV production was 375 MW in 2008. Applied Materials is the world's #1 supplier of PV manufacturing equipment, offering systems for both thin film and crystalline silicon solar products.


Applied Materials, the world's biggest supplier of solar-manufacturing equipment has opened a research center in China and its chief technology officer will relocate to that country next month. Applied Materials was founded in 1967 as a semiconductor company, has manufactured in China for 25 years, but is expanding its presence to be closer to its customers and develop products suited to the country's urban population.


"We're doing R&D in China because they're becoming a big market whose needs are different from those in the U.S.," says Mark Pinto, Applied Materials' CTO. Going forward, he says, "energy will become the biggest business for the company," and China, not the U.S., "will be the biggest solar market in the world." The move by Applied Materials is just the latest sign that China is rapidly moving to the forefront in developing renewable energy technologies.


We are seeing a replay in the new energy industry of the earlier off shore movement of U.S. consumer goods manufacture and their import back to the American market. U.S. solar power manufacturers are moving to China for production and research and exporting equipment back for U.S. Once again, we are transfiguring a manufacture industry into a service industry.


China is the largest producer of photovoltaic cells. Suntech (of China) is the second largest PV supplier in the world, with American company First Solar ranked #1. Of the 1.2 GW of cell production capacity operating or announced by First Solar, less than 20 percent exists in the United States.


Solar Production Capacity










Wind Power


China is the largest manufacturer of wind turbines. Only one of the top ten wind turbine manufacturers is American. China's top three companies' manufacturing capacity is each over 4 GW/year. Domestic wind turbine manufacturers supply a majority of the domestic market in China.


Wind energy deployment in US is reliant on a Wind Production Tax Credit (PTC), which has lapsed on three occasions. The U.S. fiscal stimulus bill extends the PTC through the end of 2012. U.S. imports of wind-powered generating sets have increased from $365 million in 2003 to $2.5 billion in 2008, while U.S. wind turbine exports have never exceeded $84 million. It is unlikely that the U.S. will ever dominate this equipment production market.


The U.S. has the world's largest wind market with a current installed wind power base of ~35 GW. China's total installed wind power is ~25 GW. By 2020, Chinese policy aims for a wind power capacity of over 100 GW, or 3% of the country's overall energy consumption.



Nuclear


China currently has 11 nuclear power plants with a total installed capacity of 9.08 GW. Seventeen new plants are under construction in China and are projected to produce 86 GW of new nuclear capacity by 2020. This will equal today's U.S. nuclear capacity of 96.245 GW. 104 U.S. nuclear power plants produce 20 percent of the electric power grid and use American nuclear technology. The US has not built a nuclear reactor since the 1970's.


President Obama is offering loan guarantee for new plants, but only two are being planned for completion by 2017. The private sector does not view nuclear energy as an efficient investment. It is not unlikely, considering the old age of existing U.S. plant, that the U.S. will out-perform China in nuclear-based electric power.


China is increasingly sourcing its nuclear power plants with domestically produced parts. Heavy forging capacity is critical for nuclear reactor construction.

There are few suppliers capable of delivering the ultra-heavy forgings that weigh >400,000 pounds. The US has no such suppliers. Two Chinese companies currently have the largest forging presses in the world, at 15,000 tons of capacity. China Guangdong Nuclear Power Holding Co. (CGNPC) will be the first Chinese company to build a nuclear plant outside the borders, in Belarus. It is positioning itself as a major global player in nuclear electric power construction.



Clean Coal, Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)


GE, itself a CCS leader, stated that China is currently more advanced in developing CCS technology than the United States and European countries.

GE and Shell both signed agreements with China's largest coal company Shenhua Group (Beijing) to develop clean coal technology. A CCS technology developed by China's Thermal Power Research Institute is being licensed for use in the FutureGen project - a 275 MW CCS demonstration plant in the United States and the first commercial scale plant to use the technology.


The same technology is also being used in China's first CCS power plant, GreenGen, which is expected to be operational by 2011. Almost all of the components for that plant are being manufactured domestically.



Electric Vehicles & Advanced Batteries


China's first electric carmaker BYD displayed its e6 and F3DM electric vehicles at Detroit's North America International Auto Show (NAIAS) in December 2009. BYD's ferrous battery e6 has an expected range per charge cycle of 330 km in cruising mode, an estimated acceleration time from 0-100 km/h in less than 14 seconds and with a projected top speed of 140 km/h.


These characteristics make the e6 ideal for daily commutes, in-town driving and even long distance travel. The new version F3DM electric vehicle also features BYD's FE battery together with a BYD 371QA 1.0-liter gasoline engine. It will be equipped with the solar panel sunroof, which can be used to channel power to the Fe battery.


The F3DM has a range of about 400 km on one tank of fuel, with a maximum speed of 160 km/h. It can also run for 100 km powered by the FE battery pack alone. These cars will be launched in Los Angeles in 2010 to the happy anticipation of Warren Buffett, who owns a 10% share of BYD. BYD sold more than 430,000 cars last year, about a 50% increase from 2008, and exported its products to the Middle East, Africa and East Europe.


All of China's major state-owned and joint-venture automotive companies have announced plans to launch electric vehicle models. SAIC Motor Corp will release a fully-electric car in 2012. China automaker Chery has introduced the S18 EV, an all-battery electric vehicle that it developed in-house. The S18 electric vehicle has a range of 120 to 150 km (75 to 93 miles) when fully charged, with a top speed of 120 km/h (75 mph).


As Chinese domestic automakers find innovative ways to produce cheap electric cars to fulfill the demand of China's domestic market, they will be able to use this technology to expand internationally. A new generation of Chinese electric cars may help drive down the production cost of electric cars globally. In doing so, electric cars may become the car of choice not only in China, the fastest growing car market in the world, but also in the United States.


Turning to the U.S. in this EV arena, the news is grim. There are only two small and unlisted EV makers in the U.S.: Tesla and Fisker. Neither company has gone public for production and marketing capital. Ford is planning to introduce four electric vehicle models in 2012, following earlier Chinese launches. As for GM, its early deliberate destruction of its all electric EV1 is not likely to put GM in the EV race. It is launching a hybrid-electric vehicle, Volt, in 2012. Chinese and Asian vehicle makers will dominate the U.S. EV auto market.


Biomedical, Translational and Clinical Research


The U.S. has a clear lead over the China in the field of biotechnology and biomedicine. The U.S. is home to the majority of biotech industry's revenues, profits, and jobs. It has more than 300 publicly listed biotech companies, and leads the world in biotech and biomedicine basic research. But the picture changed in 2008. By the 2nd quarter of 2008, following the financial crisis, the number of biotechnology venture backings fell by nearly 50%, and the dollar amount invested fell by more than 40% from the first quarter.

China is moving very rapidly in this field. It has had double-digit growth in its biotechnology industry and has gone from being one of the slowest to one of the fastest nations in the adoption of new biotechnologies. China has more than 2,800 biotech firms and looks to capture clinical and translational research and commercialization. China will focus on regenerative medicine, genomics and stem cell research.


The sector has been vigorously supported by public funding in translational research. China has had double-digit growth in its biotechnology industry and has gone from being one of the slowest to one of the fastest nations in the adoption of new biotechnologies. The government is intent on pushing applied research, driving Chinese firms to develop new therapies in pioneering fields such as gene therapy and stem cells U.S. venture capital in biotechnology, more structured for longer term economic results.


Two new investment factors are entering the picture. On the Chinese side, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) announced in October 2009 that it was creating 20 venture-capital funds that would be worth 9 billion RMB (US$1.3 billion). A fair portion of this will go to biotechnology. In addition, American venture capital in 2009 invested $3.7 billion in Chinese start-up enterprises, an increase from 2007's $3.6 billion, but a decrease from 2008's $5 billion, but only a small portion of this external investment is going into Chinese biotechnology. The interest of potential international investors in Chinese biotechnology is typically muted by concerns about quality control and IP protection. Chinese domestic venture capital has been reluctant to invest in this sector, when they can achieve earlier gains in other technology sector.


The biotech sector is seen in China and internationally as a core area of national scientific and economic development. Backed by government intent to promote innovation and fuelled by the "brain gain" of talented Chinese scientists and entrepreneurs returning from abroad, China's biotech industry only needs a more favorable domestic investment climate and stronger IPR protection to emerge as a global force in the production of new therapies and medicines.


The first commercialized gene therapy product approved anywhere in the world was Gendicine, an injection used in the treatment of head and neck cancers developed by Shenzhen SiBiono GeneTech Co., Ltd. More than 5,000 patients have been treated with Gendicine, about 400 of them from overseas. The drug is currently undergoing further clinical trials in China for several new indications, including liver, abdominal and pancreatic cancer.


Several Chinese companies are working in the field of human and animal stem cells. One of them, Beike Biotechnologies, has organized a network of satellite hospitals, clinicians and research laboratories to commercialize its stem cells therapies, which involve harvesting stem cells from the umbilical cord or amniotic membrane, in vitro expansion, and administration to patients either intravenously or by injecting directly into the spinal cord. Beike has treated more than 1,000 patients, including 60 foreigners, for a variety of conditions including Alzheimer's disease, autism, brain trauma, cerebral palsy, diabetic diabetic foot arteriosclerosis and spinal cord injury.


Despite its daring medical science innovation and stunning breakthroughs, including the world's first commercialized gene therapy product and the sole cholera vaccine tablet, Chinese firms face an uphill battle in attracting high-risk venture capital needed to sustain innovative, research-driven projects.


In the view of Peter A. Singer, MD, of the McLaughlin-Rotman Centre for Global Health (University Health Network and University of Toronto), "The Chinese biotechnology industry is like a baby dragon, which will grow quickly and soon become hard to ignore. It's no longer the case that the industrialized world has hegemony over biotechnology innovation."


The U.S. situation in this industry has a peculiar gap between relatively stable public investment in basic biotech research and declining private sector investment onshore translation and commercialization of discoveries. Pharmaceutical companies are moving translational research and clinical trials to China and India, where they are much less expensive and where the FDA is increasingly certifying foreign sourced institutions and facilities. With this trend, venture capital will eventually follow suit. It remains to be seen, whether an economic recovery of liquidity will sustain the U.S. lead or whether the trend of investment is toward Asia, principally China and India.



Nanotechnology


Nanotechnology deals with structures of the size 100 nanometers or smaller in at least one dimension, and involves developing materials or devices within that size. Nanotechnology is very diverse, ranging from extensions of conventional device physics to completely new approaches based upon molecular self-assembly, from developing new materials with dimensions on the nano scale to investigating whether we can directly control matter on the atomic scale.


There has been much debate on the future implications of nanotechnology. Nanotechnology has the potential to create many new materials and devices with a vast range of applications, such as in medicine, electronics and energy production. Nanotechnology is estimated to be a $2 billion industry by 2012 and is projected to represent 11% of world's manufacturing jobs by 2014.


China's nanotechnology capability is world class. According Dr. Richard Applebaum and Rachel parker of the University of California at Berkeley's Center for Nanotechnology, China is planning to use existing nanotechnology studies as a starting point and then "leapfrog" the West by further developing the current research.


As of 2007, China was second to the United States in government spending on nanotechnology by investing $250 million (Holman et al 2006: 25) against a U.S. Government investment of $1.5 billion. The U.S. National Nanotech Initiative projects FY 2010 projects an expenditure of $1.64 billion. We have no comparative for Chinese 2010 investment. But is it generally felt among professionals China's governmental spending on nanotechnology may not be far off when adjusted for purchasing power parity, by taking into account labor and infrastructure. Its investment has already surpassed that of any other country after the US. Applebaum & Parker conclude that Chinese nanotechnology output will likely exceed US output in terms of quality as well as quantity within a decade or less. China has more than 5,000 persons engaged in nanotechnology research and development at leading universities, research institutes and enterprises.


By 2005 China had equaled or possibly surpassed the U.S. in terms of total output for academic/peer-reviewed publications on nanotechnology, with a substantial increase in publication rate from around 2003. By 2009, China produced more scientific papers on nanotech than any other nation.


Nanotech plants have sprung up in cities from Beijing in the north to Shenzhen in the south, working on products including exhaust-absorbing tarmac and carbon nanotube-coated clothes that can monitor health. Companies are working on nano-touchscreens for mobile phones. Teams are working on a material to replace the indium tin oxide (ITO) used in the kind of touch panels found on BlackBerrys and iPhones.


Last month, researchers from Nanjing University and colleagues from New York University unveiled a two-armed nano-robot that can alter the genetic code. It enables the creation of new DNA structures, and could be turned into a factory for assembling the building blocks of new materials.


Looking at the 2009 numbers, the U.S. has slipped from being undisputed world champion in 2001 to racing neck & neck with China for a bronze medal in 2009, while Russia and the EU are racing ahead. "The overall trends are irrefutable," says Dr James Wilsdon, director of the Science Policy Centre at the Royal Society, "China is snapping at the heels of the most developed nations, in terms of research and investment, in terms of active scientists in the field, in terms of publications and in terms of patents."


Estimates of the size of the nanotech market are wildly fluctuating. Tim Harper, founder of the nanotech consultancy CMP Cientifica, sees a global nanotechnology market that could top US$2 trillion by 2012. Harper predicts that by 2010, areas of nanotechnology and biology will have merged, setting in motion the production of a wealth of new drugs and clinical equipment (such as the vials of nano-materials for use in health products, clothes and cosmetics). His research sees nanotech pharmaceutical and healthcare products worth an estimated $3.2 trillion by 2012, with military-use nanotech products taking 14% of the total market and worth $40 billion.


Harper goes onto say that "the Chinese are further along in their thinking than even the US on using these technologies for the good of the environment." The US may still lead the nano surge overall, but Harper believes China will be on a par with the EU and US by 2012.



IC/Electronic Industry


U.S. companies are world's leaders in "fabless" (design only) semiconductor companies, such as Qualcomm, AMD, Broadcom, and Marvell. These US companies outsource fabrication to foundries in Asia. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is currently the world's leading "pure play" foundry. As cross-strait investment eases, Taiwan's IC industry is increasingly moving production to China for lower cost. This movement of production to China has an impact on process R&D, which tends to be associated with place of production. Of the new R&D sites planned for construction in the next three years by the 177 leading semiconductor companies, 77% will be built in China or India, often using US corporate financing.


The production value of China's IC design, manufacturing and backend industries is projected at US$17.6 billion in 2010, growing 15.4% from 2009.

Beijing Semiconductor Manufacturing International (SMIC) is China's leading semiconductor producer. SMIC has joined the ARM® Foundry Program, an innovative business model that enables fabless semiconductor companies in emerging markets to gain access to ARM processor technology for use in the design and manufacture of advanced system-on-chip (SoC) solutions. ARM is headquartered in Cambridge, UK and is the world's leading semiconductor intellectual property (IP) supplier and as such is at the heart of the development of digital electronic products.


SMIC offer fabless semiconductor companies and design houses access to ARM foundry technology in a cost-effective and flexible manner. "ARM's relationship to significantly strengthens support for customers in China who now have access to SMIC's world-class manufacturing expertise for their ARM core-based designs…. We continue to see a great deal of innovation within the Chinese semiconductor market," said Jun Tan, president, ARM China. "In today's competitive market, many customers are looking for faster time-to-market and greater flexibility for the design and manufacture of their products," said James Sung, vice president of marketing & sales, SMIC.


The U.S. has long lost on shore IC production. It lost design to Taiwan a decade ago. Now it is losing design and R&D to foreign invested companies in China and to big Chinese producers like SMIC. While American IC companies may thrive in global sales, it will not generate jobs in the U.S. and will see a declining job contribution to the global design and R&D sectors of the industry.



Advanced equipment production


According to Rick Schneider, President and CEO of FANUC Robotics America, Inc., "Within 15 years, a labor gap will develop when 70 million baby boomers retire and only 40 million new workers enter the workforce. To fill this gap, it is important to invest in product-enhancing tools such as automation and robotics, enabling manufacturers to increase efficiency, reduce cost, maintain control over their operations and produce the highest quality products. Innovation and automation that produce bottom-line results will make the difference between life and death for manufacturers in the near future,"


Schneider says, "Automation is absolutely critical for North American manufacturers to be competitive in the world market because it helps reduce costs, increase quality and improve control of manufacturing operations." As an example, Schneider cited a case in which welding equipment manufacturer Lincoln Electric (Cleveland) prevented a customer from shipping welding operations to China by creating an automated system that cut weld times by over 25 percent. Added benefits to the new automated process included significantly higher quality and improved process control.


But the fact remains that China is the 3rd largest industrial robot manufacturer behind US and Japan, through domestic companies like Shenyang SIASUN Robot & Automation Co., Ltd; and foreign invested global robotics producers like ABB Engineering (Shanghai) Ltd.


The paradox for Schneider is that while robotics can fill the gap of U.S. workforce needs as the population ages, it is not clear that the robotic equipment and devices will be manufactured in the long run in the U.S., where manufacturing and R&D costs are high. Indeed the U.S. will be a consumer of robotics, but will it withstand the pace of China to out manufacture robotics? The technology marathon is not a race for consumption, but for the development, commercialization, production and sale of advanced technologies.



High Tech and Research Parks


An American university research park is an area with a collection of buildings dedicated to scientific research on a business footing and is associated with a university or consortium of universities. They may be managed by universities or independently incorporated and managed, with some form of university affiliation. Typically businesses and organizations in the parks focus on product advancement and innovation, as opposed to industrial parks which focus on manufacturing and business parks that focus on business services.


For the past decade, U.S. industrial R&D has migrated increasingly from corporate facilities and staff to American universities, where universities and government grants picks up a good piece of the cost. American universities and American university research parks (URPs) are a major source of U.S public and private sector R&D. The U.S. currently has 170 university research parks in North America. The median URP employs 750 people, has a <$1 million operating budget, 6 buildings, limited or no profitability, 114 acres, and 30,000 square feet of incubator space. 75% of the parks have either no retained earnings or less than 10% of retained earnings.


This profile does not do justice to the larger URPs like Research Triangle Park, MIT, Purdue Research Park, and others. Research Triangle Park is one of the oldest and largest science parks in North America. It is a 7,000 acre development that is home to more than 170 companies employing over 42,000 full-time knowledge workers and an estimated 10,000 contract employees. It is located at the core of the Raleigh-Durham-Cary combined statistical area. RTP is a globally prominent high-technology research and development center that serves as an economic driver for the region. Purdue Research Park in West Lafayette, IN is today home to over 140 companies on the main campus alone.


China has a different model for R&D development. Chinese universities have on-campus R&D programs. University R&D, Government research institutes, and private enterprise R&D are located in centrally approved High Tech Parks. There are 54 national high-tech parks in China, employing 6.5 million people in their production companies, research institutes, and incubators. Zhongguancun, referred to as "China's Silicon Valley," is a 7-park zone in Beijing, home to over 20,000 high tech enterprises. In 2009, Zhongguancun grew 20% and generated US$170 billion in revenues and US$20 billion in exports. Twenty of Z-Park's Chinese high-tech companies are listed on the NASDAQ, including Sina, Sohu and Baidu.


According to Craig Spohn of Louisiana Tech Cyber Innovation Center,

"China just announced their intention to build 30 research parks
by 2010, and 60 percent of their economy will be based on the technology industry and the developments produced from those research parks…We will have to compete with that."



High Speed Rail


The Harmony Express from Wuhan to Guangzhou is the world's fastest train, accelerating within one minute to 193km/h and doing a steady 350km/h by the time it hit its first bend. Wholly Chinese-built using technology from Siemens and Kawasaki, the Harmony Express is faster than Japan's Shinkansen bullet trains and France's TGVs. It covers the 1000 kilometers between Wuhan and Guangzhou in three hours. The trip previously took almost 11 hours.


By 2020, China will have 13,000 km of high speed rail (HSR). Travel time from Beijing to Shanghai will be four hours. HSR in China will enable industry to move from north to south and east to west, and create a mobile high skilled professional work force. Intellectual capital moving throughout the country comfortably and efficiently will have great economic impact. New cities and industrial zones are being built along these lines, and urban terminal districts are being redeveloped for high tech commerce. One-third of the current China fiscal stimulus is devoted to the construction of this HSR system.


The U.S. currently has no HSR system. Plans for regional HSR are just being developed by individual State governments. Funding is uncertain and the U.S. has no HSR production capability. Nor is any planned.














Conclusions


  • China's technological capability is moving faster than the 20th century Asian tigers.


  • China's government investment is consistent (based on 5 year plans), whereas U.S. public budgets are volatile, subject to elections and the shifting forces of special interests.


  • China-based enterprises have government support for translational research, whereas U.S.R&D focuses on basic science to universities and government laboratories.


  • There is no significant US government support for translational research. 50% of U.S. Federal government R&D is defense related, with limited GDP impact.


  • Chinese R&D stays onshore, while U.S. companies are moving substantial R&D offshore to Asia, principally to China in many sectors, and to India in some sectors.


  • US business has moved from translational R&D and commercialization to acquisition.


  • China is winning the race in new energy production.


  • China will produce and export electric cars to the US market within a short period of time.


  • The race for biotechnology basic science dominance is the USA's to lose.


  • China will lead the world in nanotech.


  • Chinese high tech parks are far beyond the scope and scale of even the largest US research parks.


  • China is a breeding ground for high tech startups.


  • China will lead the world in HSR transit.




Challenges for the U.S.


If the U.S. objective is to create new drivers of the economy and new high skill and high wage jobs, than the U.S. R&D budget is misallocated in many respects. In the first instance, U.S. basic science R&D is subsidizing the translational research and commercialization in China and other parts of the world. It saves developing countries the cost of discovery and invention.


In the second instance, the budgetary focus of a deeply indebted society on social improvement is misaimed. For example, federal support for improved health care assistance does not create new capital intensive industries and market-based jobs.


The U.S. needs an industrial policy that supports translational R&D for commercialization in new technologies that produce new job drivers for the economy. It needs a technology investment bank to finance start-ups that ar above the VC risk investment levels.


There has to be a culture change in American scientific faculties from allegiance to basic science to a new dedication to applied science and engineering. The U.S. can no longer afford to subsidized knowledge for its own sake. This was only possible when American industry invested in onshore applied R&D. That period has gone.


The Federal Government cannot rely on universities to translate and commercialize discoveries and inventions. It needs more national laboratories for technology translation and commercialization, as well as fiscal policies for private business affiliates to incentivize them to produce onshore. Otherwise, R&D and high tech investment will continue to migrate abroad to lower cost countries like China that have great science and engineering talent pools and vast new markets to access. U.S. venture capital will migrate along with human capital assets. There are more IPOs in China than in the U.S.


The US must open its door wide to all foreign scientific and engineering talent that wants to come, in order to maintain a university and National laboratory pool which is already over 50% foreign. Easier policies must b adopted for permanent residence.


For a debtor nation, the Government has to allow the sale to all interested buyers of advanced technologies that are now restricted for export. The U.S. must rectify its trade deficit and gain revenues for reinvestment in technology. Without sales and re-investment, technology leadership, where it still prevails, will vanish.


These are harsh steps, but the facts command attention. The technology marathon is already half over and the U.S. is behind. The only energy for a final leg of the race is a culture change to force feed our children in science and engineering; a social change to commercialize our scientists; a political change to let talent in the door and induce them to remain; and a national security change to sell advanced technology for the financial nutrition to get to the finish line.

Monday, November 23, 2009

Growing Domestic Consumption

Chinese economic development for the past two decades has depended on the rapid export growth of consumer goods to developed markets. The current and likely long term decline of export dependent growth has led the Chinese government to espouse and promote increasing domestic consumption in order to absorb manufacturing capacity and employment.

Three courses of fiscal policies have been taken: 1) employment and income support through infrastructure spending; 2) direct incentives to consumers and retailers, such as tax reductions, credits and subsidies; and 3) transfers payments to build a social safety net of healthcare, unemployment benefits and pension security are being put in place to stimulate consumption. But so far domestic consumption growth has been modest. It is assumed that these government policies will have growing force; but this may not be the case. Vast Infrastructure stimulus is time limited. Consumption subsidies in a savings culture reach a point of diminishing returns. A social safety only enhances the value of savings. Germany is a good case in point. It enacted Europe’s earliest safety net in the 19th century and retains to this day Europe’s highest savings rate.

Fiscal policies cannot alone overcome the historic habit of the Chinese people to save instead of spend. Cultural habits of saving that are rooted in a history of “tough times” can only be broken by the persuasive for of entrepreneurial marketing, in consort with pro-consumption fiscal policies. The willingness and ability of companies to invest in marketing to consumers is the horse that pulls the cart of government fiscal policy; not the other way around.

As an American marketer in China helping producers and retailers over the past ten years, I know the trepidation of Chinese shoppers to part with their cash; and what it takes to get them to do this. They will abide risks of spending for investment to grow their money, whether stocks, real estate or even gambling, but they hesitate to spend money on goods and services that perish with use.

It is natural for human beings to save so they do not have to depend on others to help them live decently when times get bad or when their earning power diminishes. Consumption, beyond necessities and immediate pleasures, is an artificial behavior. It only becomes “natural” once a new habit of consumerism takes its place..

Consumerism is not just buying more goods; it is a cultural disposition to spend money for new goods and services, beyond immediate need or pleasure. It is really spending for the joy and confidence of personal aspirations. The agent of this cultural change is the science and practice of marketing. Government must support it, but also constrain its inherent momentum through regulation to a point of sustainable balance between personal income and debt. The U.S. failed to regulate this measure. But China has the ideology and government means to control this.

The power of marketing to change habits rests upon a complex system of marketing management. This system encompasses sophisticated marketing research of personal and social consumer desires. It methodically segments consumer markets to find the small groups of specialized unmet desires. It makes tremendous investment in research, development, application and commercialization to launch goods and services to meet these desires. Statistical methods contrive to target the right consumer segments to a company’s product or service offering. Competition for target market share only sharpens the quality and features of offerings that make them even more desirable and expensive.

Enormous investment in branding imbed a high perceived value of these offerings into the consciousness of target consumers and make it easy for them to recognize and decide what they want to buy. Repetitive promotion whets the appetite by building consumer awareness, interest, and desire for these offerings. Distribution and retail (store and Internet) makes these offerings accessible to people for purchase. Pricing places an exchange value on these goods so that people feel they are getting fair or even more value than they are paying for. The sales process finalizes purchase transaction and completes the battle of marketing to overwhelm the natural resistance to save for future security against inevitable misfortunes. Companies spend billions of dollars to carry people through this process of spending down their savings and incurring debt to buy goods and services for their pleasure, career advancement, social status and power.

If the Chinese government wants to encourage domestic consumption, it has to support enterprise marketing in many ways. It has to gather household data from the official census and make it available to intermediaries to analyze, organize and sell its consumer relevance to enterprises. Government has to expand the distribution of credit cards and authorize banking and insurance mechanisms to process credit transactions and manage default risk. It has to support a security structure to authenticate purchases. It may, as in the U.S. during the 1960s and 70s, deduct consumer credit interest payments from personal income taxes. There is a vast inventory of Western government instruments that the Central government can draw upon to support enterprise marketing in China. One thing is clear, government fiscal policy alone cannot achieve the consumption growth it requires to offset export decline. It must support an enterprise marketing infrastructure.

I personally lived through the U.S. cultural change from saving to spending, and as a marketer contributed to it. Change began in the 1950s with the introduction of credit cards. In the mid 60s my brother Philip Kotler published his seminal 1st edition of Marketing Management. Philip turned marketing into a science and consumer companies followed his science with practice - building marketing organizations within the body of their companies and driving marketing campaigns that radiated through the media of the country. Universities business schools followed Philip’s direction and built an academic disciple to advance this science and practice. They turned out marketing managers for every consumer company. These managers and their cohort of advertising agencies, public relations, direct marketing companies and credit card issuers turned a savings culture into a spending culture. Multinational consumer companies spread this system to the four corners of the world.

Marketing produced a big change in U.S. personal savings. If 1975, well after the safety net was in place, savings were 17.6 percent of income. Marketing intensity brought this rate down to1.75% in 1985 and by 2005 down -.4%. By 2006 it fell to -1%. When we couple this with the fact that between 2000 and 2007 U.S. households nearly doubled their outstanding debt to $13.8 trillion—an unprecedented amount in both nominal terms and as a ratio of liabilities to disposable income (138 percent), you can appreciate the force of consumer marketing to change a culture. By 2006, consumption accounted for 70% of U.S. GDP.

If China wants to grow consumption for sustainable internal demand, it will have to cut its personal savings rate in half and turn trillions of Yuan into internal demand growth. It will have to invent its own approach to powerful marketing with enough regulatory control to prevent the evaporation of savings and the kind of debt explosion that precipitated the U.S. financial crash of 2007. China’s socialist economy, unlike the U.S. free market economy can accomplish this. The fact that a trend can become excessive if unchecked does not mean that its regulated moderation should be dismissed.

China’s path to marketing must be also be mindful that foreign companies in China know how to market and have the deep pockets to penetrate Chinese consumer demand. The marketing organizations of Chinese companies today cannot match this experience. If the China wants its own enterprises to profit from consumer growth if will have to encourage and support Chinese companies to build marketing organizations and branding, promotion and distribution capabilities. Chinese universities will have to take marketing seriously and steer good business minds to the marketing disciple, instead of the finance discipline towards which they now headed.

An effective policy of consumption that will befit Chinese enterprise requires a deep cultural shift in the thinking of Chinese leadership. This is new stage for China. Deng Xiaoping initiated an economic development policy based on export cost advantage. The export policy of the 1980s was a great leap for Chinese leadership from decades of internal planned economy. But it was still production focused and carried forward the industrialization mentality of the planned economy, except directed to external demand rather than internal development.

Consumption of a scale to absorb long terms export decline is “a horse of a different color.” It requires a cultural leap to focus production of what consumers want. There is no heritage of this in China’s modern history. It is a new stage of China’s socialist market economy based on the idea that people should enjoy life today, rather than fear the future. This view challenges the normal disposition of leaders to await global economic recovery for renewed export growth. This normal view is really a gamble that may not succeed.

Tuesday, March 3, 2009

Consumer Credit: The Key to Domestic Growth

Economic Stimulus[1]

China is committed to a policy of domestic economic growth to offset a declining rate of export growth. Export accounts for one-third of Chinese output. Decreasing exports due to global slowdown (recession + protectionism) will result in factory down scaling, shutdowns and skyrocketing unemployment. This will affect all of China’s export regions.

There are two Western ways to stimulate domestic economic growth: 1) Increase consumer demand for goods by increasing employment through infrastructure investment and reduced interest rates for private investment to meet increased demand (Keynesian economics) ; 2) using incentives for people to produce goods and services, such as adjusting income tax and capital gains tax (Supply side economics.). Both approaches aim to increase the amount of money consumers will spend on goods, but takes different paths. Keynesianism increases government spending to increase demand and employment; supply side economics increases private spending and investment to increase demand and employment.

The problem with these models in China is that there is no assurance that increased employment and money in the pocket will be spent to boost the domestic economy. China has a savings culture (over 40% of earnings) while the U.S. has a spending culture (zero savings). This difference is reflected in the size of the retail sector in both countries. China’s retail sector accounts for only 30% of GDP; while U.S. retail accounts for 70% of GDP. In the U.S. people will spend all of the money in their pocket and move on to their credit cards. In China, people will spend only a small portion of new money. They will save the rest. Hence, western models in China would result in much less economic stimulus than in the U.S.

A further fact must be considered to understand the impact of Western models on consumption. The average Western consumer leverages every new dollar in the pocket with consumer credit. Hence, economic stimulus is compounded. China, on the other hand, is still a cash economy, so there is no leverage on added earnings. In fact the opposite is true. An extra dollar in China results in only $.60 cents of spending. Hence it is far most costly in China than in the U.S. to gain an equal amount of demand for a given amount of stimulus.

Some argue that the key to Chinese domestic growth is to convert savings into spending. But this is an intractable cultural problem. How do you change a 3,000 year habit? And how do you win the political battle with National banks and their state-owned industrial borrowers that want to retain savings deposits? It is more reasonable to leverage the 60% of earnings that are spent on consumption by instituting widespread consumer credit.

Expanding Consumer Credit

Government expansion of consumer credit requires a marketing strategy. All marketing strategies consist of nine steps.

1. Vision. Den Xiaoping said, “It is glorious to be rich.” This early vision of China’s export market economy did in fact build wealth at the top through direct foreign investment to a new class of owners who invested that money in factories and capital equipment for an export economy. They paid taxes and fees, which in turn built public infrastructure.

The new policy of domestic growth requires another vision, “It is glorious to consume.” This mantra affirms the pivotal role of the middle class in supporting Chinese domestic growth. They have the resources for consumer credit. They will not spend enough cash to grow the domestic economy. But they will spend credit and work hard to revolve and extend their credit lines. Many other countries have gone through this process. The Chinese government will regulate consumer credit expansion.

2. Objectives. Credit card use is very new in China. There are 100 million credit cards in circulation. Most credit cards are used for business expenses, not personal or household consumption. Credit lines are also very limited. A typical card will carry a credit limit of RMB 20,000. This is hardly enough to make a make a down payment on a car. It is reported that 85% of car sales are cash transactions.

The government has to set a reasonable objective for the projected size of the consumer credit card market. That size has to be a percentage of retail sales and a percentage of GDP. The benchmarks of different countries are all over the place. In the U.S. consumer credit is $2.6 trillion, or 20% of GDP. The U.S. retail sector is 70% of a $13 trillion GDP, or $9.1 trillion. Nearly 1/3 of current retail is supported by current consumer credit. The U.K. is closely approaching the same ratio of consumer credit to GDP as the U.S.; but Germany, Norway and Sweden are at around 10%, while Hungary, Switzerland and the Czech Republic have a 3% ratio of consumer credit to GDP. Mexico has a low percentage of the credit cards to population – only 34%. China has a much lower percentage. So what is a viable benchmark?

The most reasonable benchmark appears to be Germany. Like China, Germany has a high savings rate and an export ratio of 40% to GDP. So it is not unreasonable to project a 10% ratio of consumer credit to GDP as a long term objective in China. The official exchange rate GDP of China is $3.2 trillion. Using the German benchmark of 10%, consumer credit should be at $320,000,000. China’s current ratio is less than 1%of GDP. Hence, China has a long way to go and requires a policy regime to grow consumer credit to a reasonable level to meet objectives of domestic growth. China needs a 5-year plan for consumer credit growth to reach the lower standard of the Czech Republic at 3%. A second 5-year plan could boost it to the German level of 10%.

3. Target Customer Segments. The only way to achieve rapid growth of consumer credit from a very low starting point is to market cards to segments of the population that already have them and use them to some degree for personal consumption. That means more cards and extended credit lines to current users and their demographic and psychographic cohorts. A qualified cohort profile can be extracted from current data. It would include all people similar to the people who already have and use credit cards. In all likelihood, 80% of that cohort either do not yet have credit cards or do not yet use their credit cards for personal consumption.

There are two segments that fall into this target market. The first group is the population under 24 – “the little emperors” of a one child policy. They are at the universities in major cities and have enough cash from their parents to pay credit card bills. They are spending their parent’s savings, so they have taken the first step to be true consumers. Consumer credit will leverage their family cash support for minimum payments and enable this segment to buy several-fold the amount of goods they are buying for cash. Their credit lines are limited because they are not employed, or fully employed. But they are a numerous class and can generate a high volume of credit based retail sales.

The second segment is the professional and young entrepreneurial class 25-50 in age. They need to show success and status and are paying cash for these the emblems of achievement. But they psychologically need to buy more than their cash permits. They are employed and have a rosy future. They can support a substantial credit line. The proper targeting strategy for fast domestic growth through consumer credit is to penetrate the cohorts that have cards and use them. There is no need to try to convert endemic savers into spenders.

4. Value proposition. The value of consumer credit to target segments is that credit cards multiply the goods you need to impress those with whom you are connected and those with whom you wish to be connected. This is an economic value proposition. Consumer credit is an investment in your advancement. As the Chinese economy matures, the value proposition will shift to Western modes of emotional rather than economic purchase, like impulse purchase, cult, or identity purchase, experience consumption, shopping sprees and other non-economic motives. But China is not there yet, and hopefully will not reach the excesses of the West. The economic value of status is enough to greatly expand the domestic economy.

5. Brand strategy. The government and card issuers need a brand strategy to manifest the value proposition with powerful messages, symbols and design. This requires the best way to tell the story of personal success through consumption; consumer happiness through brand identity; portraying leaders and celebrities as consumer role models; improved design to enhance the shopping experience; and the social value of credit use to the country.

6. Products. There are many credit card products. Typically in the West there are many levels of branded card offerings that relate appropriately to different demographic and life style classes. Silver, gold and platinum cards denote wealth classes. Affinity cards that are issued by banks, associations and companies reflect life style hobbies to which cardholders are very loyal. Sport teams issue cards, along with airlines, social cause groups, and so on.

7. Promotion. Cards are typically promoted through direct marketing by mail, online advertising and application or direct enrollment at events of card issuers. Credit card issuers spend a lot of money on print, TV and online marketing. The government will have to play an active role in promoting credit cards by its communications and information agencies.

8. Pricing. Annual fees, interest rates and rewards are key elements in the competition between credit card issuers. China has to be careful to regulate these matters and avoid the usurious interest rates prevalent in the West.

9. Distribution. The backward supply chain of credit card distribution is complex. Applicants have to be evaluated for credit qualification. Credit has to be financed by a chain of financial institutions and service organization. Risk has to be widely distributed. The forward supply chain is also complex. Distribution companies like American Express, Visa, Master Card, and Union Pay need information systems to organize and implement issuance, transactions, payments from buyers, payment to sellers, as well as receipts from and payments to financing sources and regulatory agencies.

Benefits of Consumer Credit

Chinese policy and Chinese enterprise have great aspirations for innovation and branding. But it is very important to understand how these aspirations relate to consumer credit. Innovation creates a useful or desirable value-added object. Branding adds a rational and emotion appeal to the innovation. But consumer credit makes it possible for people to buy these products.

So long as Chinese consumption remains on a cash basis, very few people can afford to pay cash for discretionary goods. They save their cash to purchase a home, a car and educate their children. They lay out a lot of cash for these fundamental purchases and take out banks loans for the balance. There is little cash left for goods that can support status and advancement, like gifts, stylish and fashionable apparel, entertainment, home furnishings, consumer electronics, and other appurtenances of personal success and achievement. They need to purchase expensive goods to display their status. Innovation and branding tempt purchase, but consumer credit enables purchase and accelerates domestic economic growth.

[1] This article was published in February, 2009 in the 21st Century Business Herald.

Friday, February 20, 2009

Searching for Markets

The following is a speech given by Milton Kotler at The Wharton School of Finance, University of Pennsylvania on February 21, 2009.

Introduction
•I have only ten minutes to tell you where companies in China are searching for customers in this global recession.
•I will not waste time telling you how bad things are.
•I will limit myself to:
–Where Chinese companies are going to market in China
–Where Chinese companies are going to market internationally
–Where foreign companies are going to market in China.

Chinese Companies in China
•There are three “ Going to Market” roads for Chinese companies in China:
–Follow the “stimulus” program.
–Expand the consumer credit market
–Add value to consumer products
–Penetrate the countryside

Stimulus Market
•Infrastructure
–Dilemma
Only super-size infrastructure is controlled by the Central Government and can be measured for stimulus efficiency.
Big infrastructure will benefit SOEs.
Local infrastructure is decentralized. The Central Government cannot control “pork” allocation and corruption beyond normal means. (Much like giving stimulus money to the States in the U.S.). Hence, little stimulus efficiency.
Private companies will struggle for local development “relationship” deals.
Bank lending will double this year over last year to capitalize both levels of infrastructure.
•Supply side industry subsidies
–Export industries will get cost reduction subsidies to capture more export market share in declining global trade.
–Loans for retail expansion
•Social benefits and welfare
–Health care companies will benefit from health care expansion and upgrade. The government needs new NGO social service groups to serve the poor.

Consumer Credit
•The Central government is encouraging consumer spending with more loans and tax incentives
–Bank loans for auto and household durables purchase, mortgages loans
–Purchase tax incentives
–Trying to contain credit supply within the state owned banking structure. This will not work.
•China will have to extend consumer credit credit supply to private retail channels.
–This is the crux of demand side stimulus
–People will not spend their savings; only spend credit.
–The government banks and private lenders needs data and systems to expand consumer credit.
–Major entrepreneurial opportunity for Chinese companies that can service the growth of this industry..with data, systems and media promotion.
–The government will have to promote a public campaign….It is Glorious to Spend!

Brand Trend in China
•The Chinese brand trend is different than the Western trend
–The Western trend is down-brand
–The Chinese trend is a mix of up-brand and value brand movement
–Depending on the depth of the Chinese slowdown there may be a convergence.
•Price-only goods dominate the Chinese domestic mass market.
•Rising worker and farmer earnings are moving shoppers to value brands
–Galanz is changing is lowest price strategy to a value brand with added features
•Aims to compete more forcefully with Midea
•The middle class is moving from value brands to standard brands
–Rowe in autos; Hisense in Appliances
•Foreign makers own the premium, performance and luxury brands
–But they are moving down-market with standard and value brands

China Brand Challenge
•Continue competitive advantage in price-only and value brand production for the domestic market and global export.
•Move domestic branding from lowest price to value brands
–Block foreign brands from invading value market.
–Foreign makers are trying to move into this high volume market and capture urban worker and rural purchase.
•Move forcefully to capture the domestic standard brand market.
–This is a new brand level market for China’s middle class.
–The Chinese middle class wants to move from value to a higher notch of quality and status. As the middle class matures, standard brands will take over.
•Don’t try to compete with foreign makers in the performance, premium and luxury brand levels.

Penetrate the Countryside
•The government is putting a lot of its stimulus into the countryside.
–To reabsorb unemployed urban workers who are returning to their towns and villages.
–A lot of the old farm land is gone
–Policy requires rural development: town and village development.
•Small scale local enterprise assistance
•Micro-financing
•Better education and training
–Chinese companies are moving more small scale production and distribution and sales into the countryside.

Chinese Companies Internationally
•Protection is an operating assumption; therefore:
–Focus export on developing countries where China has enough political leverage to prevent doors from shutting.
–Develop production, assembly and distribution in foreign markets.
–Acquire foreign value brands

Diversify Export
•China will increase export to developing countries to offset declining export to developed markets. China will:
–Use its past decades of political relations with developing countries in Africa, Mideast, SE Asia and Latin America to prevent protectionist exclusion and optimize access.
–Leverage its resource and infrastructure investments in these countries for consumer export access.
–Use highly flexible overseas Chinese communities and labor deployment programs.

Export Production
•Prolonged global recession will require more cheap goods
•China is the master of cheap goods production
–State policy models – SEZs (Special Economic Zones)
–Industrial operations, labor resources and risk culture
–Supply chain management
•China will follow the pattern of the U.S. to export production, assembling and distribution to foreign markets.
•Local production in foreign markets adds brand value..meeting local quality and safety standards.
•Protectionism trend will accelerate a multi-national trend for Chinese enterprise. We will see Chinese economic development zones in the U.S.
–Chinese SEZs will support their enterprises to locate abroad to protect and expand their market access and retain tax revenue from these enterprises.
•Shenzhen has an industrial zone in Vietnam.
•TEDA (Tianjin Economic Development Zone) has a SEZ in Egypt
–Chinese production and distribution enterprise will be accommodated (grudgingly) in foreign market for employment and local tax generation.

Acquire Foreign Value Brands
•It the current global recession, good global brands are for sale and are “dirt cheap”
–Lenova paved the way with IBM’s Think Pad.
•The company is struggling for its global foothold and other Chinese enterprises are watching to see if they can make it.
–Sichuan Auto is talking about purchasing Hummer from GM
•We may see Chinese purchase of off-loaded U.S. carmaker brands
•Dying brands in the West, like Buick, seem to succeed in China.
–Esprit died in the U.S. and is now a big hit in China.
–Haier made a play for Maytag
•As China becomes more “global” and more confident in its business management, they will buy foreign brands for brand premium and distribution margins.

Foreign Companies in China
•China will pressure foreign companies in China to prevent protectionism in their home countries.
•As the recession deepens and unemployment grows in the home countries this may not work; therefore:
–Become more Chinese!
•Sell more corporate bonds and equity to Chinese investors and companies.
•Acquire Chinese companies
•Strategic alliances with Chinese companies
–Promote consumer credit in the China market for foreign goods
–Penetrate the major urban markets with value and promotion
•Local politicians will make it hard to penetrate the countryside for foreign goods

Diplomatic Load
•Profit from China operations and sales is the life blood of many foreign companies.
•China will press foreign companies doing business in China to pressure their own home countries to play down currency manipulation allegations and protectionist threats.
•This business diplomacy will struggle to transcend WTO channels and seek bi-lateral agreements. It may not work.

Acquire Chinese Companies
•As Western domestic consumer markets shrink, foreign companies will have to expand their China portfolio.
–It is the only large growth market without high debt and instability downside.
•New inventive financing for these acquisitions
•New forms of China partnership deals
–Help advance China privatization policy
–Application of skilled Western technical and management talent to China
•IBM offers option to lay offs to move to new sites in China and India.
–Changing the global business model of foreign companies
•Wal-Mart is opening more stores in China than in U.S.
•Etc. for Starbucks, YUM, and many other franchises.
•Acquisition strategy will require bi-lateral political negotiation and agreement.

Strategic Alliances
•The key to strategic alliance for foreign companies with Chinese companies for market position is:
–Technology transfer
–China acquisition rights in home countries
–Increased DFI
–Shouldering political burdens for China
–Sharing distribution rights and margins

Consumer Credit
•The smartest thing for Western companies to do in China’s consumer and B2B market is to advance consumer credit.
•Western consumer companies should take the initiative to promote and facilitate consumer credit
–They have the technical and marketing skills to advance these systems
–They have a larger global framework for risk management.
•Cooperate with the China government banks to advance this frontier for domestic growth.

Sustain Position in Urban Markets
•Western products enjoy the confidence of quality and status in China’s urban markets.
–This is the essential competitive advantage of Western products in China.
–Chinese companies and brands are trying to catch up.
–If Western companies soften their quality and prestige by countryside downgrading, their value will decline.
•Don’t make the Mercedes A Class mistake.
–There is still great room for penetration in the sophisticated primary and secondary cities.
–Apply resources to strengthen brands and penetration urban markets, rather than endanger advantage through rural distribution.

©Milton Kotler, Kotler Marketing Group

Doing Business in China

Doing Business in China:
Establishing Small- and Medium-sized American Enterprises
By
Milton Kotler *
© Copyright, May 2008

Most of the American commentary on doing business in China has focused on large multinational companies. But more and more people with small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) are seeking to establish a foothold in that country and are searching for principles and policies that will help them avoid the pitfalls inherent in setting up a business in a foreign culture with new and evolving rules of business conduct. They need two kinds of information: 1) detailed information about regulations, business intelligence, demand and supply, and the marketing practices of their industry in China. This kind of information is readily available from business journalism, technical reports and industry reports. And 2) a general sense of how to conduct their search for Chinese and American counterparts with whom they can work—partners, experts, strategic allies, customers, managers, staff and support services. That is the human side of business and it is a minefield for the newcomer. This article outlines basic policies for avoiding these pitfalls, based on nine years of serving the interests of Chinese and SME American businesses. This article is excerpted from Why China? An American Business Adventure.”**

Policies for Establishing a Business in China

The American business man or woman needs to know how to acquire an effective introduction to China, how to facilitate his or her way into the country and once there, how to find partners: how to build, manage and lead the business; and how to serve clients and customers. (Americans will also need to become familiar with the Chinese language and business culture and, if they plan long stays in the country, how to find the friends who will make their lives there pleasant. These are dealt with in the author’s book.)

Before You Go. Important sources of information in the U.S. consist of colleagues, experts and friends who are already involved in China. In addition, journalists’ coverage--particularly the business press—and technical reports are helpful. But for the most useful background Americans should turn to U.S. academic institutions, the Chinese embassy and consulates in the U.S., the trade and professional associations in their fields and local Chinese-American and Western meet-up groups.

University business schools often have executive seminars on doing business in China. While the cost of attending may sometimes be high, it is seldom prohibitive and these are important busness investments, not only for their educational value but also the benefit of introducing you to peers with whom t0 share information. Every Chinese consulate throughout the U.S. has a commercial officer who is there to talk with American entrepreneurs and can supply official and personal knowledge. There are Chinese business groups in almost every American city at which Chinese-Americans merchants and professional meet regularly. They willingly reach out to the broader community and will welcome you to a meeting where your business interests may fit opportunities some of them are seeking.

Several national associations have Chinese programs. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce conducts a Chinese business program in several cities. The U.S.-China Business Council in Washington, D.C. holds workshops in the U.S. and publishes reports on various business topics. And the National Committee of U.S. China Relations has a very active program of public affairs education concerning China in many cities. Their membership is prominently involved in business, government and academic institutions in China.

Many trade and professional associations are increasing their Chinese programs to meet the business needs of their members. There are also informal “meet-up” (see http://www.meetup.com/) groups of Chinese and Western social and business networks in every major city. These offer a good way to make Chinese acquaintances who can introduce Americans to friends in China. (Be careful to check out any grandiose claims a new Chinese “friend” may make.)

Once You’re There. In China you will meet people who can connect you to potential partners and help you make practical decisions about your business mission. The American with a modest budget who hopes to establish an SME must find a good Chinese partner early in the game. While Chinese commercial policy requires joint-ventures in designated industries, you’ll also have a practical need for a Chinese partner for a wholly owned foreign enterprise. You will also need a professional advisor or consulting firm--either American or Chinese (the American advisory, or consulting firms are far more expensive)--for strategic assistance. Most of the Chinese consulting companies have Western-trained, English-speaking staff and know the Chinese industries, companies, and leaders better than the American firms. Check their client list and ask for references. There are also independent consultants who will offer you their help. The American should be careful in dealing with this group and should not waste time with anyone who offers to help on a commission or success basis.

Still a third group of people who will facilitate your entry into China’s business world consists of Chinese companies who will contact you. Communications among the Chinese is very fast and word will spread quickly that you are looking for a partner. Companies in your field of business will soon know that you are looking for a partner and will--after some screening to be sure you’re legitimate--ask you for a meeting to discuss a possible relationship.

Partners. A Sino-American partnership involves many more than two parties. On the Chinese side, private enterprises may involve family, friends, investors, and other businesses with which the enterprise is associated. There are also support partners in the areas of supply, distribution, governmental relations, business development, finance, customer relations and operations. All of them participate in the value of the enterprise and most of them have to be consulted by the Chinese partner for consensual agreement before entering a Sino-American partnership. The American “partner” may also, of course, consist of more than one participant, but seldom to the same degree. Americans may be confused by the fragmentation of the Chinese enterprise they are dealing with but in reality, the American side, which is more vertically organized, may in fact take a longer time for communication and decision than the Chinese side takes to move horizontally. American vertical decision patterns are just as confusing to the Chinese as theirs are to us. It is well to keep that in mind when negotiating with Chinese partners.

Goals. Americans tend to look for short-term, transactional deals since they have a world of industrial trade and investment opportunities to choose from and can find a lower-cost provider or a better market. The Chinese, who are new to the global marketplace and therefore less sure-footed, tend to look for on-going relationships. The American has to decide at the outset of a partnership discussion if he is in for the long haul and he must communicate that very clearly. If he only wants a transactional deal, then he must be prepared for the fact the Chinese side may short-change him in exact proportion to the weakness of the intended business relationship.

Age. American partners are usually older than Chinese partners. It is not unusual to meet a 35-year-old CEO of a multi-million dollar company. Even State-owned companies have largely replaced an older generation of managers and executives with younger, well educated people. But this age disparity is good for Sino-American partnerships because Chinese culture in general reveres age and young Chinese managers respect older businessmen from American and Europe whose experiences has been in free markets rather than planned economies. It’s good policy, therefore, for an American SME to send its most experienced, and probably oldest, executives to China to make deals the company is looking for.

Transparency. Americans expect a transparency of information from potential Chinese partners, but that is rarely possible. Many Chinese business relationships are not formally documented; accounting standards differ; relationships with government are based gaunxi (personal relationships); and so on. Chinese company governance is different from that of American companies. They do not have to report to the government or to their shareholders the same amount of information that American companies are required to report and a great deal of activity that is off the books is very hard to uncover. You need to engage a competent professional to conduct due diligence. There’s not much you can do about all of this, except to press your Chinese counterpart for more information and then adjust your risks factors to accommodate for gaps in information.

Cultural Rituals. All the Chinese you deal with in your search for business relationships will want to spend a good deal of time with you in order to assess your character and learn about American business practices. This involves a ritual of lunch and dinner meetings which may seem unnecessary to the American who wants to make a deal and head home. But for the Chinese, personal dignity is tied up in every deal and if something goes wrong, your Chinese partner loses face in the eyes of his peers. No lawyer can repair this, so there has to be time to build genuine trust and confidence in the American party. There is always an uneasy mix of Chinese sociability and American impatience.

Managing Your Business in China. No American SME can succeed in China with a competent, industrious and responsible general manager (GM). In the beginning your GM will have to handle the development of the business and your staff. Your company is bringing a new value to the Chinese economy and it is up to the GM to introduce you to Chinese CEOs who are interesting in doing business or partnering with you. Unless you speak fluent Chinese, your GM will have to be your voice and your ears in all transactions, so it is essential that he or she has a good command of English and can interpret effectively.

Actually, you, as the leader of your company, will play only a small role in negotiations with the Chinese. Your job is to make your requirements very clear to your GM, present a gracious attitude and character at meetings and be available as needed. Your GM builds and sustains the relationship with the Chinese counterparts. However, the American SME must maintain a presence in China and that will require frequent trips.

Staff. You will need a good senior staff and this starts with bringing a top member of your U.S. company to China. He or she will work with your GM to set the standards of professional performance for the rest of your staff. This person must be willing to stay in China long enough to build a competent staff, for he or she serves as your alter ego for the quality of the work your company will do in China just as your GM serves as your alter ego for business development and management. Knowledge of Chinese is not a requirement for the job, since your GM will serve as translator and interpreter in dealings with the staff. But the person you choose should have the background and disposition of a teacher so that he or she can be effective in training new staff members. It is important to remember that members of your staff are working for you both for wages and for career development. They are serious to learn American modern business methods to advance within your company or to leverage their experience into another company at a higher position and salary.

You must learn to adhere to Chinese rules of company organization, which are much more rigid than American rules. If you say something to a subordinate that you have not cleared with his or her immediate superior, you upset the chain of command and create difficult management problems. Remember not to encourage personal staff initiatives without checking first with your GM.

Reward good performance with an extra bonus, in addition to the annual New Year bonus everyone expects. If you can’t match the salary increases they can get in another company, give them good references and don’t stand in their way. When a staff member falls short of doing the job you expect, work with your GM to explain his or her failure and spell out what you want him or her to do. It is you job to build the company culture. If the staff person continues to do a poor job, he or she must be dismissed with a careful explanation, without malice, of the reasons for the dismissal.

Support Services. All American companies in China need the support of lawyers, accountants, research companies, and other outsource firms. Given the evolving nature of Chinese commercial law and complex tax and regulatory issues, it is important to have a Chinese accounting firm to handle the bottom line of budget and control, receivables and payables, tax and social welfare payments, balance sheet, annual audit, regulatory compliance and foreign payments. Chinese policy changes frequently in the growing market economy. There are several large Chinese law and accounting firms that are very trustworthy for on-going service. They are much less expensive than American firms. For the start-up, however, though they are more expensive, it is probably easer to deal with an American firm in China and move toward a Chinese firm later.

Dealing with Clients, Customers and Experts. Once you have set up your business and are dealing with Chinese clients and customers, you will find that they expect you to do a great deal more for them than would be the case with American counterparts. Details abut service deliverables, product quality, logistics and payment schedule must be pinned down with as much precision as possible or the customer will always ask for more. There will always be latitudes of interpretation in any contract, so it is necessary to budget with full awareness that you’re going to be asked to do more that you’ve agreed to do. In addition, market circumstances and government policy can change over night and the SME must be constantly aware of these changes and continuously adapt project management and deliverables throughout the course of a project.

An American SME may have to outsource a number of elements of a project. Either Western or Chinese expertise may be necessary. The Western expert will undoubtedly to be more expensive and will usually require tutoring by the SME to prepare them for the Chinese situation, additional demands by the client or for changes in government policy. If the expert is not flexible enough to deal with this situation, the project is in danger of foundering. Chinese experts, on the other hand, my be less expensive at the outset but may be carrying an overload of other assignments at a lower cost in order to attract more business. The danger here is that either they cannot deliver on schedule or they subcontract the assignment without your knowledge and deliver poor quality. It is prudent to investigate their true workload and to develop very specific and deliverables, personal responsibilities and schedules so you can terminate the relationship without legal headaches if there is a performance failure.

Your Chinese clients will expect you to attract investment funds for his or her project as well as design the project. Every private Chinese company is looking unceasingly for capital. Chinese banks favor State-owned companies, so there are limited capital vehicles for private businesses. Unlike American marketing consulting companies that separate strategic marketing from investment attraction, most Chinese companies will not pay for marketing studies without an identification of prospective investors. There is a danger in integrating investment attraction services with every project. Investment services target a particular niche of investor interest. The momentum of this targeting can force its way into the strategic direction of your company and drive it to focus on that niche to the detriment of a broader service offering.

Americans in China. American and other Westerners are not bringing a market economy to China; the market economy, although only 25 years old and still growing, is already there. And Westerners have to find their way to enter it by bringing something new and valuable into a dynamic pattern of growth. The Chinese business culture does not exist from 9:00 am to 5:00 pm. Chinese owners and managers work hard and take little time off for recreation and family affairs that Westerners find so necessary.

The concept of “saving face” is all-important to the Chinese, whereas Americans are more concerned with creative deal making and legal formulation than with personal honor. The American business person can inadvertently humiliate his Chinese counterpart and in order to avoid it has to recognize that a Sino-American partnership is a trusted collaboration with all of the collateral elements of business--partners, investors, operators, customers, suppliers, connections, friends and family.

Despite the pitfalls which confront the American leaders of SME businesses in China, the chances for establishing a successful business there are growing exponentially. Chinese industry is now beginning to develop strong domestic markets to match the strength of the country’s global activities and American SMEs can take an active role in contributing to that development while working with their Chinese partners.


*Milton Kotler is President of Kotler Marketing Group (KMG), headquartered in Washington, DC with offices in Beijing, Shenzhen and Shanghai, China. KMG China has three divisions: strategic marketing; urban and industrial land development and marketing and marketing and sales training. KMG China has been operating since 1999. mkotler@kotlermarketing.com; http://www.kotler.com.cn/. My thanks to Carla Sykes for editing this article.
**Kotler, Milton, Why China? An American Business Adventure, (forthcoming)